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AIDE-MÉMOIRE

CNRM

East Timor Diplomatic & Intelligence Digest

conselho nacional da resistencia maubere
national council of maubere resistance
conseil national de la résistance maubere

Comissão Directiva da FRETILIN • Comando das FALINTIL • Resistência Nacional Estudantil de Timor Leste • RENETIL

DECLARAÇÃO

O C.N.R.M. Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere, sediada na Austrália, Sydney em 2A Bayswater Rd., Suite 25 Kings Cross, com representação em Portugal na Rua Amadeu Sousa Cardoso, 13 r/c Dto, em Odivelas, declara para os devidos e necessários efeitos, ter, no exercício das suas competências e para realização dos seus fins, mandatado o **Instituto Para a Gestão e Promoção de Instituições**, para a realização e coordenação de campanhas de recolha de fundos, a favor da causa por si defendida, através de meios de comunicação. Mais declara que ao mesmo I.G.P.I. é conferida a exclusividade mundial da realização de tais campanhas, com excepção da Austrália.

Lisboa, 14 de Abril de 1994.

José Ramos-Horta

Dr. José Ramos Horta

Address:

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Instituto para a Gestão e Promoção de Instituições

Exmos. Senhores,

Sentindo que as Entidades de solidariedade social lutam com dificuldades crescentes, dada a falta de apoios oficiais, a diminuição de donativos provocada pela actual crise, o agravamento de custos que vão desgastando as energias dos responsáveis já de si sobrecarregados com tarefas correntes de gestão, surgiu o INSTITUTO PARA A GESTÃO E PROMOÇÃO DE INSTITUIÇÕES - I.G.P.I.

O I.G.P.I. é a resposta especializada para ajudar as entidades de solidariedade a resolver os seus principais problemas, ou seja, gerar fontes de receita.

O I.G.P.I. ocupa-se, sem quaisquer custos para as entidades suas clientes, das iniciativas, diligências que a estas tradicionalmente competem, com profissionalismo, envergadura de meios direccionados para a criatividade, originalidade e principalmente na motivação do público-alvo.

Os meios que utilizamos passam pelos mais actualizados estudos de audiência de todos os canais de televisão e principais estações de rádio; os mais recentes dados estatísticos do - I.N.E.; a produção, criação e transmissão de "spots" televisivos e radiofónicos, assim como inserção de anúncios na imprensa escrita para angariação de fundos; modernas centrais telefónicas com capacidade de atender dezenas de pessoas em simultâneo; recolha de donativos via telefone; tratamento informático de verbas e dados.

Esta forma revela-se eficaz para uma campanha que irá envolver todo o país, e cuja resposta, por parte do público, se prevê e antecipa mobilizadora e imediata - (chamadas de valor acrescentado).

A criatividade e a originalidade nas formas de abordagem são os principais pontos de um projecto de incentivo. O objectivo é lançar mão de recursos para envolver o público-alvo num processo de motivação, que vá ao encontro dos seus desejos e anseios.

Assim, vamos dar início a uma campanha massíva, direccionada para a sensibilização dos Portugueses que terá como objectivo, a recolha de fundos para Timor, sendo a sua cobrança transparente feita através dos TLP e Telecom.

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standing army. External security will rely on a Treaty of Neutrality, guaranteed by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. Working with its neighbours and the UN, East Timor will endeavour to declare the country's surrounding seas a Zone of Peace, and to work towards demilitarisation of the Southeast Asian and South Pacific regions.CNRM aspires to a strong democratic state based on the rule of law, emanating from the will of the people expressed through free democratic elections. Development of a free information media , as independent as the judiciary, will be encouraged. Firmly believing in the universality of human rights, transcending state boundaries and prevailing over state sovereignty, an independent East Timor will contribute to the strengthening of the human rights machinery. The creation of an International Human rights Court and a penal court to try war crimes and crimes against humanity will be actively supported. All human rights treaties will be submitted to the East Timorese Parliament for ratification.

Free education and health care is essential for the welfare of the population. significant investments in these areas will be required, as part of human resource development. The money saved from not supporting a standing army will be well used in these areas. A healthy, sane and happy society cannot be based on hatred and revenge, therefore a general amnesty and national reconciliation will be proclaimed, aimed at forgiving current enemies. Because of its credibility and standing over the past twenty years, the East Timor Church will be expected to play a major role in the special healing process. The issues of resettlement for the many thousands up-rooted throughout the last two decades, as well as compensations for properties lost will need to be addressed. Also, over 100,000 Indonesians have settled in East Timor, many of them looking for a better life. Those who are willing to abide by East Timorese laws and live in harmony as members of the society will be welcome to stay and join in building a better future for everyone. The wealth of their culture could be an enriching contribution of the future of East Timor.

East Timor is potentially self-sufficient in most agricultural goods, meat and fish. It has large oil reserves and other minerals. After independence, economic resources will be channelled into food production for the population. Government policies will be a result of close consultation with the people in each region, town and village. The cooperation on UN Specialised Agencies will be sought A reforestation program to save the badly damaged environment will be launched together with international bodies. International partnership in mineral explorations such as oil will be sought. However, the environment must not be sacrificed for short term gains. The 'Timor Gap Treaty' will be looked at, clarification sought, and renegotiated. The sea boundary dispute will have to be settled through an international tribunal.

EAST TIMOR PEACE PLAN

Consistent with the enhanced peace making role of the United Nations, CNRM has advanced a plan to assist the UN Secretary General's mandate to find a solution to the East Timor conflict. The plan is congruous with statements by East Timor Catholic Church leader Bishop Belo, and consistent with current UN and Portuguese approaches. The plan has also received support in the US Congress, Europe, Canada and Japan. Indonesia's friends have been able to perceive its value as a potential means of assisting Jakarta to conveniently extricate itself from its East Timor quagmire.

Phase One (one to two years): Indonesia-Portugal talks under the auspices of the UN Sec. Gen., with East Timorese participation, to achieve an end to armed activities in East Timor; release of political prisoners; reduction of Indonesian military personnel; removal of armaments; expansion of international Committee of the Red Cross activities; reduction of Indonesian civil servants; population census; access by UN Specialised Agencies for restoration and protection of the environment, resettlement, district development, women and children care and public health and immunisation; restoration of all human rights, removal of restrictions on Portuguese and Tetum languages; setting up of an independent Human Rights Commission. appointed of a UN Sec. Gen. Resident Representative in East Timor.

Phase Two- autonomy- (five years); This is a transition stage of autonomy in which East Timorese would govern themselves democratically through their own local institutions. This would require; Democratic election of a local Assembly with a five-year mandate under UN supervision and assistance. Only East Timorese may vote and be elected; election of an East Timorese Governor for a five-year term by the Assembly; Assembly powers to include legislation concerning international trade relations, investment, property, immigration and others; withdrawal of all Indonesian troops and further reduction in Indonesian civil servants; territorial police force organised by the UN placed under the command of the Governor, the territory is to have no army.Phase two may be extended by mutual consent between Indonesia and the East Timorese population expressing their views through a referendum.

Phase Three - self-determination-: Covers preparation for a self-determination referendum, to be held within one year of the commencement of this phase, whereby the population may choose between free association or integration into Indonesia, or independence.

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EAST TIMOR

AN INTRODUCTION TO



CNRM

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF MAUBERE RESISTANCE
CONSELHO NACIONAL DA RESISTENCIA MAUBERE

THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM

The territory of East Timor, a Portuguese colony for over 400 years, is located on the fringe of the Indonesian archipelago, between Southeast Asia and Australia in the vicinity of the South Pacific. It is at least equal,if not larger, in size and population than some 30 independent member states of the UN. East Timor has been the scene of a major and tragic conflict since 1975. In that year Indonesia invaded this 18,889 square kilometre territory, maintaining to this day its illegal presence in defiance of international condemnation, including United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The armed forces of the large Indonesian Republic maintain a war of genocidal proportions, in a futile attempt to crush the resistance of most sectors of the approximately 700,000 East Timorese. Massive human rights violations have caused the death of over one third of the population. Resistance against Indonesian occupation remains strong as international support for the cause for freedom and self-determination of the East Timorese people grows.



CNRM ORIGINS AND COMPOSITION

The East Timor-based National Council of Maubere Resistance, CNRM, is the supreme organisation of the East Timorese nationalists struggling for self-determination and independence.CNRM was created in 1988 by Resistance Leader Commander Xanana Gusmão as a unifying non-partisan body bringing together the East Timorese political forces, the National Liberation Forces, *Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste* (FALINTIL), and all the underground East Timorese political resistance groups operating in East Timor and Indonesia.

From its creation in 1975 until 1987, *Falintil* was the armed wing of *Fretilin*. It led the national war of liberation until 1979. After 1979, and in particular after the reorganisation the resistance in 1981, traditional East Timorese political parties lost their pre eminence to an all encompassing movement of national liberation. In 1987, aiming to consolidate national unity, reflecting the true nature of the Resistance, Xanana Gusmão announced *Falintil* as a national liberation army not linked to or dominated by any single party.

CNRM has thus emerged as the organisation embodying all currents of East Timorese nationalism, and the chief vehicle through which it is expressed, both inside East Timor as well as in the diplomatic arena. It brings together the leadership of The Resistance Armed Forces in East Timor, The Political Front inside Indonesia and occupied areas, and the Diplomatic Front operating overseas. Participation in CNRM is open to all East Timorese nationalists seeking self determination and independence, regardless of any political party affiliations they may also hold.

LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

CNRM's leadership inside is grouped into the Executive Council of the Struggle/Armed Resistance and the Executive Council of the Struggle/Clandestine Front. The first is made up of three members of the *Chief of Staff of Falintil,* and two from the Directive Commission of *Fretilin*; it is chaired by Nino Konis Santana, Commander in Chief of Falintil. The second is made up of five members of the political front; given the nature of the struggle and of the Indonesian governing regime, its operations are clandestine. Following Commander Xanana Gusmão's capture in late 1992, CNRM is now led by a troika comprising Nino Konis Santana; the head of the Political Clandestine Front; and the head of the Diplomatic Front, CNRM Special Representative Jose Ramos Horta. Commander Xanana Gusmão remains the titular head of the resistance

MISSION

The chief mission of CNRM is to lead the resistance against Indonesian occupation and enable the East Timorese people to freely determine their future in accordance with their internationally acknowledged human right of self determination. Simultaneously to the conduct of East Timorese resistance activities, CNRM is attempting to develop the governing institutions of the future state of East Timor. Inside East Timor and Indonesia, CNRM is supporting the development of the human resources required for a future administrative bureaucracy; undertaking measures to protect the culture and language of the country; and monitoring the human rights situation and informing on violations. Overseas, CNRM is leading a diplomatic struggle aimed at achieving, within the United Nations framework, a peaceful resolution of the East Timor issue in a manner reflecting the aspirations of the majority of its people and acceptable to the international community

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OVERSEAS

The resistance outside East Timor is led by Co-Chairman Jose Ramos Horta, appointed CNRM Special Representative in 1990. He has full authority and competence to deal with all matters affecting the national resistance of the East Timorese people abroad. The Co-Chairman is assisted by two Special Assistants, and two Executives in his Executive Office. The Departments CNRM has set up, or is in the process of creating are: International Relations; Community Relations, Social and Religious Affairs; Education and Culture; Documentation and Information; Administration and Finance. Autonomous bodies are: Timorese Centre for Human Rights Education, Information and Training; and East Timor News Agency. These are assisted by a Technical Commission comprising a Media and Communications Director, a Legal Officer, a Human Rights Consultant, and a Washington based lobbyist. As present resource limitations are overcome and more human and material resources become available, these organisational components will be developed further and additional organs required for the functioning of CNRM will be added. Proposed additions include an advisory Eminent Persons Council, comprising some East Timorese elderly, traditional leaders, intellectuals and religious etc.

CNRM Representatives in key locations in the world report to the International Relations Department. These missions include Australia, Canada, Europe, Portugal, South East Asia, and the USA. Additional Representations are soon to be opened. CNRM fund-raising efforts are centralised through the Executive Office. The Media and Communications Director is solely responsible for issuing CNRM public statements. East Timorese Culture is promoted and advanced through the Education and Culture Department. Members run a Tetum language school in Australia. The Centre for Documentation and Information stores documentation available to researchers, publishes *MateBian News* on a monthly basis, and performs daily news postings on electronic media conferences such as *reg.easttimor* and *reg.indonesia*. The Centre for Human Rights Information and Training monitors human rights disseminates information, and provides training in available mechanisms and human rights norms and humanitarian law.

CNRM POLICIES FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR

Aware of the country's location, CNRM believes in close and harmonious relations with all neighbouring states in Asia and the South Pacific. The independent Republic of East Timor will seek membership of both ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum. Close ties with Portugal will also be maintained, given the high moral standing it has shown through its abiding commitment to East Timorese self-determination.

East Timor is at the crossroads of three major cultures and religions: Melanesian, binding its people to the South Pacific; Malay-Polynesian, as many East Timorese trace their roots to Southeast Asia; and, European, a result of the four centuries of Portuguese-Catholic presence.This influence give the East Timorese nation-state a distinct character.It could be a valuable partner for ASEAN and South Pacific Forum member states in their relations with the European Union, Africa and latin America. The majority of East Timorese exiles are resident in Australia and Portugal.They could contribute to the bridging role of East Timor between their adopted countries and Southeast Asian and South Pacific states.
CNRM envisages an independent Republic of East Timor without a

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Conferencia de Imprensa sobre Timor Leste

do Representante Especial do CNRM

e Coordenador da Comissao Coordenadora para a Frente Diplomatica

no "Espaco por Timor", 23 de Junho de 1994

Senhores jornalistas, gratos pela vossa presenca.

Convidamo-vos para esta Conferencia de Imprensa para vos apresentarmos os nossos pontos de vista sobre algumas questoes, nomeadamente, a situacao em Timor Leste, a nossa participacao na reuniao inaugural da CPLP, e os nossos pontos de vista sobre a implementacao da declaracao de Genebra de 6 de Maio de 1994.

I. A situacao em Timor Leste e a missao do Relator Especial da ONU

O relator especial das Nacoes Unidas sobre execucoes extra-judiciais, sumarias ou arbitrarias, Sr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, estará em Timor Leste e na Indonesia de 3 a 13 de Julho.

Esta é a primeira missao das Nacoes Unidas verdadeiramente de investigacao desde o massacre de 12 de Novembro de 1991.

No nosso ponto de vista, o Relator Especial das Nacoes Unidas terá que incidir a sua investigacao sobre:

1. O massacre de 12 de Novembro de 1991 para se estabelecer com rigor o numero de mortos e a sorte dos desaparecidos;
2. Os massacres que tiveram lugar no mesmo dia no hospital de Dili, os casos de envenamento de feridos, assassinatos a sangue-frio dos feridos, que se alegam no filme "Morte de uma Nacao";
3. As valas comuns: estas devem ser escavadas;
4. A situacao geral dos presos.

A situacao que prevalece hoje em Timor Leste caracteriza-se por uma escalada de agressao militar e intensificacao da repressao politica. Os comprimissos solenes assumidos pelo MNE indonesio, Sr. Ali Alatas, perante a Comissao de Direitos Humanos (declaracoes por consenso de 1992 e 1994) e o Secretario-Geral da ONU (decaracoes de NY de 17 Setembro de 1993 e de Genebra de 6 de Maio de 1994) tem sido sistematicamente atropeladas. A situacao de direitos humanos agrava-se de dia para dia. A pratica de tortura é rotina.

II. Implementacao da declaracao de Genebra

Desloquei-me a NY de 20 21 de Junho para consultas com o Secretario-Geral Adjunto da ONU para Asia-Pacifico e com o Director da Divisao Asia Oriental e Pacifico.

Apresentei aos representantes do SG os pontos de vista do CNRM e da Comissao Coordenadora para a Frente Diplomatica quanto a implementacao das clasulas relevantes da Declaracao de Genebra, nomeadamente, sobre o encontro entre representantes da Resistencia e o MNE indonesio, o dialogo entre timorenses e a questao central que é a necessidade de uma solucao global do problema.

No quadro do paragrafo 8 da Declaracao de Genebra, solicitei os bons oficios do SG no sentido de transmitir ao MNE Ali Alatas o interesse e a disponibildade do CNRM e da CCFD de se avistar com o MNE indonesio o mais cedo possivel em data e local mutuamente aceitaveis.

Voltei a insistir na participacao plena de Xanana Gusmao e do Bispo Dom Ximenes Belo em todo e qualquer processo de busca de uma solucao para o problema de TL.

O paragrafo 9 da Declaracao de Genebra "chumbou" as manobras da Indonesia em transformar a questao de Timor Leste num conflito entre timorenses. A dita reuniao de "reconciliacao" patrocionada pelos servicos secretos indonesios com o conluio de certos timorenses foi rejeitada por toda a resistenca e pelo clero timorenses e pela propria ONU.

Em Genebra foi rejeitado o termo "reconciliacao" e foi acordado o termo "dialogo inclusivo intra-timorense". Por outro lado, foi acordado que seria a ONU a anfitriã de um tal dialogo intra-timorense.

O sr. Abilio Araujo, recentemente expulso da FRETILIN, esteve em NY para tentar convencer a ONU a endossar uma segunda reuniao de "reconciliacao" a ter lugar em finais de Julho em Roma. O sr. Abilio Araujo em vez de solicitar a ONU para ela ser a anfitria de um encontro entre timorenses, está sim a reeditar o encontro de "reconciliacao" de Londres e está a tentar que a ONU e o Governo Portugues sancionem essa sua manobra.

Desnecessario será dizer que a Missao indonesia em NY junto às Nacoes Unidas ja se avistou com os representantes do SG apoiando a posicao do sr. Abilio Araujo.

Denunciamos aqui a persistencia do Sr. Abilio Araujo em embarcar em aventuras politicas que so tem causado grande inquietacao no seio dos

timorenses e o repudio da resistencia e do clero. O Sr. Abilio Araujo arvora-se em patriarca de "reconciliacao" com certos colaboracionistas, mas declarou guerra aberta contra toda a resistencia, contra Xanana Gusmao e Konis Santana e agora contra o proprio Bispo Ximenes Belo.

Nao existem duvidas hoje de que o governo indonesio é que patrocina e financia o encontro dito de "reconciliacao", nao existem duvidas de que é Jakarta que está a orquestrar todo o processo tendo em vista fazer descarrilhar a questao de Timor Leste da ONU.

Transmiti ao Sub-Secretario-Geral, sr. Kitani, a nossa posicao e ela é firme e inalteravel: o dialogo com vista a uma solucao do problema de Timor Leste passa pelas Nacoes Unidas. A CCFD está disponivel para participar num encontro entre timorenses na diaspora e no interior de TL, incluindo timorenses nas fileiras da resistencia, sob o alto patrocinio conjunto da ONU e do Bispo de Dili, Dom Ximenes Belo. Deve a ONU iniciar as consultas necessarias com todos os timorenses no sentido de se preparar um encontro entre timorenses. Nesse encontro, caberia a ONU e ao Bispo Belo o papel de anfitrioes. Este é o unico formato credivel e aceitavel.

Num tal encontro e no quadro do paragrafo 10 da Declaracao de Genebra, os timorenses reunidos deveriam debrucar-se exaustivamente sobre o fundo da questao e propor ideias para a ONU e os dois MNEs no sentido de se avancar para uma solucao global do conflito.

III. Participacao da Resistencia na reuniao inaugural da CPLP

A Resistencia timorense, atraves da CCFD, espera participar na reuniao inaugural da CPLP e espera que Timor Leste venha a beneficiar do estatuto permanente de observador. É estranho que se levantem objeccoes a que Timor Leste beneficie do estatuto de observador com o argumento de que Timor Leste é um territorio nao-autonomo. Mas precisamente porque Timor Leste é um territorio nao autonomo é que deveria gozar do estatuto de observador. Se fosse um Estado independente, Timor Leste acederia a membro de pleno direito da CPLP.

A CCFD que engloba o Representante Especial do CNRM e Representante Pessoal do Lider da Resistencia, Xanana Gusmao, a Delegacao Externa da FRETILIN chefiada pelo sr. Jose Luis Guterres, a UDT presidida pelo sr. Joao Carrascalao, é a mandataria legitima e credenciada da resistencia. A CCFD rejeita, portanto, qualquer tentativa de se atribuir a certos elementos marginais o mesmo grau de representatividade.

Obrigado.

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TIMOR LESTE CNRM TIMUR LORO SAE

CONSELHO NACIONAL DA RESISTÊNCIA MAUBERE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF MAUBERE RESISTANCE
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE LA RESISTENCIA MAUBERE
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE LA RESISTANCE MAUBERE

THE PEACE PROPOSAL OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF MAUBERE RESISTANCE

A statement by Jose Ramos Horta, Special Representative of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) to the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the European Parliament.

Brussels, 23 April 1993

The tragic event of 12 November 1991 marks, however, a turning point in the 16 year-old conflict. East Timor is now an international issue which touches the conscience of millions of people around the world. In Indonesia itself voices of moderation and reason are being heard. There is a realisation that the invasion and annexation of East Timor and the policies of the past 16 years were colossal mistakes. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas himself has publicly acknowledged that the East Timor problem is limiting Indonesia's capacity to intervene more constructively in world affairs, is costly, and a solution must be found.

Mistakes are inherent in the human condition. Indonesian leaders must have the vision and courage of great men who can accept mistakes and propose new directions for their country policies towards East Timor and, in fact, towards their own society in general.

On the other hand, East Timorese political leaders must also have the vision and courage to meet the Indonesians half-way and reassure them that the people of East Timor wish to find a "modus vivendi" with them and to begin a new chapter in the relationship.

In spite of the untold suffering inflicted upon us, we continue to extend an olive branch to those who see us as their enemy.

Negotiations without pre-conditions under United Nations auspices

Xanana Gusmao, the Resistance Leader of East Timor, proposed and remains ready to enter into a process of dialogue with the Indonesian authorities, under the auspices of the United Nations, without pre-conditions, to explore all possible options towards a comprehensive settlement of the problem of East Timor.

The peace proposal put forward by Mr. Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the Resistance, reflects the stand of all sections of the East Timorese society inside East Timor and abroad, as well as the Catholic Church.

The Portuguese government has endorsed this peace proposal and handed it over to the U.N. Secretary-General in January.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman and honourable members of the European Parliament, to elaborate a bit on how I see the unfolding of a peace process. This would involve three phases.

Phase One — one to two years

- **The Portuguese authorities and the Indonesians should commence talks at once, under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General. This does not necessitate East Timorese direct involvement.**

For the first stage, we are proposing a modified version of the "proximity talks" followed in the Afghanistan case where in the face of Pakistan's refusal to sit face-to-face with the Kabul government, the U.N. acted as a "go-between".

This should overcome Indonesia's present stance in refusing to talk directly to the East Timorese.

This phase of the talks must focus on achieving:

- An immediate end to all armed activities in East Timor;
- Immediate and unconditional release of all East Timorese political prisoners;
- Reduction of Indonesian military personnel in East Timor from its current estimated strength of 20,000–30,000 to 1,000 within a six-month period;
- The removal from East Timor of all heavy weapons, tanks, helicopters, combat aircraft, long range artillery pieces;
- Reduction by 50% of Indonesian civil servants in East Timor;
- Expanding the presence and activities of the International Red Cross (ICRC) into every district of East Timor and in strict observance of the Geneva Conventions;
- Access to the territory by U.N. Specialised Agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, FAO, etc for the purposes of carrying out, within their respective fields of competence, a comprehensive program on:

- Restoration and protection of the environment
- Voluntary resettlement of the tens of thousands of displaced Timorese in their ancestral lands;
- Development projects in every district;
- Proper care for women and children;
- Immunisation campaign.

- A comprehensive census of the population to be undertaken by competent U.N. bodies, a pre-condition for all of the above projects to be carried out effectively;
- A Human Rights Commission to be set up in Dili, headed by the Bishop, and comprising a number of East Timorese of his choice and with the assistance of reputed Indonesian human rights organisations and the U.N. Human Rights Centre in Geneva. This Commission would report directly to the Indonesian Head of State, the Portuguese Government, with copies to the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.N. Human Rights Centre in Geneva which would circulate it to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. These reports may be made available to other institutions and the public;
- Lifting of press censorship
- Freedom of political activities and assembly;
- Removal of restrictions on, and expansion of, the teaching of Portuguese and Portuguese schools;
- The U.N. Secretary-General appoints a resident Representative who is responsible for all U.N. activities in East Timor, including reporting on the implementation of the accords.

Phase Two — five years

The first stage is indispensable for a gradual normalisation of the situation and for PHASE TWO to be effected.

At the end of Phase One,

- Portugal and Indonesia to normalise relations;
- Political parties are legalised;
- Portugal to be represented in East Timor by a legation of the European Community with a resident Portuguese official;
- A Portuguese Cultural Institute is set up with funding from the Gulbenkian Foundation, Fundacao Oriente and the EC;
- Elections to be held for a local Assembly. The election process and procedures must conform with universally-accepted democratic norms. The U.N. to provide technical support and supervision of the election;
- Only East Timorese identified as such may vote and be eligible;
- The democratically-elected Assembly elects a Governor of the Territory who has to be an East Timorese;
- The Assembly and Governor have a 5-year mandate;
- The Territory may enter in trade relations with foreign countries, promulgate all its laws affecting investment, land ownership, property etc.;
- Remaining Indonesian troops are withdrawn within 3 months. The Territory will have no army. A Territorial police force is organised by the U.N. and is placed under the command of the elected Governor;
- The Territory will have its own immigration laws;
- Further reduction of Indonesian civil servants.

Phase Three — self-determination

Phase Two may be extended by mutual consent. A 2/3 vote of the Assembly in support of extension of Phase Two is needed before the proposal is put to a referendum.

If the popular referendum rejects extension of Phase Two, Phase Three commences.

If the Assembly fails to adopt a recommendation of the extension of Phase Two, it would continue to function for up to three years while negotiations with the Government in Indonesia take place.

If a referendum votes for extension of Phase Two, elections are held within three months for a new Assembly and Governor.

At the end of Phase Two or the second regime of Phase Two, whatever the case, Phase Three covers:

- Preparations for a referendum on self-determination followed by general elections for a Constituent Assembly being undertaken within a period of one year;
- Transfer of power to the elected government takes place;
- East Timorese political leaders form a Government of National Unity;

- East Timor is declared a Zone of Peace and of Neutrality to be guaranteed by the Permanent Members of the Security Council and ASEAN;
- East Timor joins ASEAN and South Pacific Forum;
- East Timor accedes to, and ratifies, all international human rights instruments.

These are some of the ideas to be explored further when Indonesian leaders decide to come to terms with the reality that their 16-year occupation of East Timor has been an utter failure. I am prepared to fly to Indonesia or anywhere, at any time, to meet with senior Indonesian officials to commence the dialogue.

It was with an open mind, optimism and hope that in June 1974 I travelled to Indonesia and met with Foreign Minister Adam Malik to discuss the future of East Timor. The same spirit inspires me today.

In a world where dialogue has for the most part replaced confrontation, the continuing use of force by Indonesia to resolve an issue which is eminently political must be rejected by the international community. The largest army in the world was not able to prevent the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet empire. Dictators all over the world have been overthrown or are being phased out. Has anyone forgotten the Shah of Iran, Somoza of Nicaragua, Duvalier of Haiti, Idi Amin of Uganda, Mengistu of Ethiopia, Stroessner of Paraguay, Pinochet of Chile, Marcos of the Philippines and Ceaucescu of Romania?

No matter the overwhelming force used against us, our will to be free will prevail. Our dream will never die. We will reach the mountain top.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

PPo596-7

TIMOR LESTE CNRM TIMUR LORO SA'E

CONSELHO NACIONAL DA RESISTÊNCIA MAUBERE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF MAUBERE RESISTANCE
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE LA RESISTENCIA MAUBERE
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE LA RESISTANCE MAUBERE

Dados sobre as estruturas da resistência

Organização dirigente da luta em Timor Leste: **Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere *(CNRM).*** Organização supra-partidária timorense, abrangendo todas as forças nacionalistas timorenses. Criada em 1987 por Xanana Gusmão, o CNRM opera na clandestinidade, liderando a resistência armada e política. São 10 os membros que compõem a liderança máxima no interior. ***Líder máximo: Xanana Gusmão.***

Órgãos executivos do CNRM e líderes

Conselho Executivo de Luta/Frente Armada (CEL/FA). Cinco membros. Chefe: Nino Konis Santana;

Conselho Executivo de Luta/Frente Clandestina (CEL/FC). Cinco membros. Chefe: S. Sabalae;

Mandatario do CNRM no exterior: José Ramos-Horta, Representante Especial e representante pessoal de Xanana Gusmão. (Ver estrutura da Representação externa do CNRM).

Os três dirigentes tem igual posição hierárquica. Os dirigentes do CNRM são propostos pelas estruturas regionais e locais em todo o território. Apesar da natureza da ocupação militar que torna impossível qualquer prática democrática normal, os dirigentes e quadros são escolhidos após aturada consulta com as bases.

No CNRM em Timor Leste estão representadas as seguintes instituições da resistência:

Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste (FALINTIL). Estas são apartidárias. As FALINTIL foram criadas em 1975 como o "braço armado" da FRETILIN e de 1975 a 1986, eram dirigidas pela FRETILIN. Com a evolução da luta em Timor Leste e no esforço de consolidação de unidade nacional, a direcção de luta decidiu despartidarizar as FALINTIL, transformando-as em exército nacional não-partidário. As FALINTIL estão representadas no CEL/FA através da Chefia do Estado Maior.

Comissão Directiva da Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (CDF/FRETILIN). A CDF é o órgão máximo da FRETILIN em Timor Leste.

Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes Timorenses (RENETIL). A RENETIL é a maior organização de jovens e estudantes timorenses, activa na frente clandestina, esta representada no CEL/FC.

União Democrática Timorense (UDT): a UDT é a única forca política timorense que não está formalmente integrada no CNRM no interior de Timor Leste porque se desconhecem os seus possíveis dirigentes dentro da Pátria. Como se sabe, praticamente toda a hierarquia da UDT se encontra no exterior. A sua ligação com o CNRM é feita através da Comissão Coordenadora para a Frente Diplomática.

Estruturas do CNRM no exterior

Representante Especial do CNRM: José Ramos-Horta. **Gabinete Executivo do Representante Especial**: Pascoela Barreto, socióloga (Portugal); Constâncio ~~Dias~~ Pinto, estudante (EUA); Agio Pereira, biólogo (Austrália). Junto do Representante Especial funciona ainda uma Comissão Técnica: Media & Comunicações; Assuntos Jurídicos; "Lobby" em Washington.

Departamentos. *Relações Internacionais*. Representações: Portugal - Luís Cardoso, Engº. silvicultor; EUA e ONU - Constancio Dias Pinto, estudante;UE - José Amorim Dias, finalista de filosofia; Canadá - Abe Barreto, finalista de literatura inglesa; ASEAN - José Gusmão, ciências de educação; Pacifico Sul - Lúcia Corte Real, empregada bancária; Taiwan e Coreia do Sul - Khoneng Lay, comerciante; Japão - José Evaristo Madeira.

Outros departamentos ou serviços do CNRM: Administração e Finanças, Educacao e Cultura, Relações Comunitárias, Assuntos Sociais e Religiosos, Informação e Documentação, Agência de Noticias de Timor Leste (ETNA), Centro de Educação, Informação e Formação em Direitos Humanos; Projectos Especiais.

Estruturas politicas no exterior

Delegação Externa da FRETILIN (DEF): José Luís Guterres, Chefe da DEF, eleito em Plenária da Delegação Externa da FRETILIN em Abril de 1994. Outros lideres: Mari Alkatiri, Vice-Chefe da DEF e Secretário de Relações Externas; Roque Rodrigues, Vice-Chefe da DEF.

União Democrática Timorense (UDT): João Carrascalão, eleito Presidente pelo II Congresso Extraordinário da UDT realizado em Dezembro de 1993. Zacarias da Costa, Vice-Presidente e Secretário de Relações Internacionais. Francisco Nicolau, Vice-Presidente.

Comissão Coordenadora da Frente Diplomática (CCFD): A CCFD compreende o Representante Especial do CNRM, José Ramos-Horta, como Coordenador, o Chefe da DEF, José Luís Guterres, e o Presidente da UDT, João Carrascalão.

Enquanto que em Timor Leste existe uma organização única abrangente e dirigente de toda a Resistência, o CNRM, no exterior, dada a realidade política em que vivem os timorenses na diáspora, em Portugal e na Austrália, não tem sido possível criar-se no exterior o equivalente ao CNRM, isto e, uma organização representativa de todas as correntes políticas timorenses. No entanto, como primeiro passo, foi possível criar-se a CCFD que se esforça por concertar as posições de fundo e coordenar as iniciativas da resistência no exterior.

PP0596-8
TL1975

Bio notes on Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta

Full name: Jose Ramos-Horta
Date and place of birth: 26 December 1949, Dili, East Timor
Marital status: Single (father of a son)
Religion: Roman Catholic
Official residence: Lisbon and Sydney

Current positions

- *Co-Chairman and Special Representative of National Council of the Timorese Resistance* (CNRM). The CNRM is a non-partisan national body based inside East Timor comprising all Timorese parties, associations and students and youth organisations.
- *Co-ordinator* of the Co-ordinating Commission for the Diplomatic Front for all the Timorese organisations in exile.
- *Exec. Director, Lecturer*, Diplomacy Training Program, Law Faculty, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
- *Chairman*, Timorese Centre for Human Rights Information, Education and Training, Sydney.
- *Expert*, International Service for Human Rights, Geneva.
- *Administrator*, Borja da Costa Foundation, Lisbon.

Past positions

- *Minister for External Relations and Information*, first provisional government of East Timor, before Indonesia's invasion in 1975.
- *Permanent Representative* for the East Timorese independence movement in the United Nations for more than a decade - 1975 onwards.

Major *fora* addressed

- Addressed the UN Security Council, Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, Special Committee on Decolonisation, Commission on Human Rights, Council on Foreign Relations, European Parliament, etc.

Academic curriculum, writings and publications

- Fellow, International Relations, St. Anthony's College, Oxford;
- Master in Peace Studies, Antioch University, USA.
- Attended The Hague Academy of International Law
- Attended the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg
- Author of *FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor*, Red Sea Press, Trenton, NJ(1987); *TIMOR: Amanha em Dili*, Dom Quixote, February 1994;
- Written extensively on international affairs.

Languages

Tetun (native language), Portuguese (official), French, English, Spanish.

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CONSELHO NACIONAL DA RESISTÊNCIA MAUBERE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF MAUBERE RESISTANCE
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE LA RESISTENCIA MAUBERE
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE LA RESISTANCE MAUBERE

DADOS SOBRE TIMOR LESTE

Estatuto jurídico

Território não-autónomo sob administração portuguesa. Invadido pela Indonésia no dia 7 de Dezembro de 1975. O Conselho de Segurança da ONU condenou a invasão e exigiu a retirada das forças indonésias do território ao mesmo tempo afirmando o direito do povo de Timor Leste a auto-determinação e independência.

História

"Descoberta" por navegadores portugueses em 1511. Antes da chegada dos Portugueses, toda a ilha de Timor (superficie: 30.000 km2) era dominada por dois reinos independentes: o dos Belos, correspondendo ao actual Timor Leste e o de We-hali (ou Behali), correspondendo ao actual Timor indonésio (ocidental). Os dois reinos mantinham relações políticas normais. Timor Leste ou o reino de Wehali nunca caiu sob a dominação dos impérios hindus e muçulmanos e a posterior colonização holandesa que resultaram na actual Republica da Indonésia.

Superfície e População

18.889 km2 e 700.000 habitantes (dados de 1975). Existem cerca de 100-150 mil imigrantes indonésios em Timor Leste. Crescimento demográfico médio: 2,1 %. Segundo esse crescimento médio, Timor Leste que em 1975 já tinha uma população estimada em cerca de 700 mil devia contar hoje com cerca de 900 mil a um milhão de habitantes.

Religião

Católica: 90%. Chefe da Igreja: Bispo Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, dependente directamente do Vaticano. Minorias cristas, muçulmanas e budistas.

Línguas

Português, proíbido mas ainda muito utilizado; *tétun*, língua timorense de maior implantação, mas também proibida; *bahasa indonésia*, língua oficial imposta pelas autoridades de ocupação. Timor Leste é a maior presença viva portuguesa em toda a Ásia.

Riquezas naturais

Petróleo, gás natural, manganês, mármore, café, madeiras, copra, pesca. Segundo alguns geólogos australianos, no Mar de Timor e dentro da Zona Económica Exclusiva de Timor Leste, existem reservas de hidrocarbonetos avaliadas em 5 mil milhões de barris. A Austrália e a Indonésia assinaram o chamado "Timor Gap Treaty" para exploração conjunta de petróleo no Mar de Timor. O Estado português apresentou queixa no Tribunal Intenacional de Justiça contra a Austrália pela assinatura do Tratado. Por seu lado, o CNRM, através do seu Representante Especial moveu uma acção no Supremo Tribunal Australiano contra o mesmo tratado. O Supremo Tribunal australiano já anunciou para 9 a 11 de Agosto a audição pública sobre a acção movida pelo CNRM.

Administração militar indonésia

Governador: Abílio Osório Soares, imposto pelo exército indonésio.

Verdadeiro administrador do território: Cor. Johny Lumintang, comandante militar indonésio. Partidos políticos timorenses são proibidos. Existem um total de cerca de 30 mil soldados indonésios em Timor Leste.

PP0596-90

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY JUNE 1 1994



A REGIONAL BULLY

Manila caves in to Jakarta over occupied East Timor

As a result of pressure from Jakarta, and capitulation by President Ramos in Manila, a private conference on occupied East Timor, organised at the University of the Philippines, has leapt to unexpected prominence. In a sequence of events which reap shame for the governments of both countries, Indonesia and the Philippines have given the world a tutorial in "Asian values".

The unsavoury story runs as follows. A clutch of human rights organisations wished to conduct a conference in Manila on occupied East Timor. There should be nothing in this to startle the observer: since the Indonesian army invaded that ill-starred territory in December 1975, it has murdered over a third of the population.

Its violation of international law was comparable with Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait and General Galtieri's misadventure in the Falklands. Yet, without paying even the smallest price, Jakarta has ignored numerous resolutions of the UN Security Council calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and upholding the right to self-determination of the Roman Catholic Timorese.

In its domestic affairs, the Indonesian regime is not accustomed to making a distinction between the public and private domains. Employing the same methods in its dealings with a sovereign neighbour, it ordered Mr Ramos to "cancel" the conference. When the Filipino President pleaded that he was powerless to do so, Indonesia flexed its muscles. It threatened to cease its mediation between the government of Mr Ramos and the Muslim-separatist Moro National Liberation Front; what is more, it rumbled darkly of the "consequences" for the Philippines of a collapse in peace talks.

That was not all. Indonesia broke its promise to attend a trade fair in Davao, causing a cancellation of the event; and it has impounded a number of Filipino fishing vessels whose activities in Indonesian waters it had previously tolerated. Mr Ramos then gave in to Jakarta's bullying. He issued a presidential decree banning all foreign nationals from attending the conference. Mairead Maguire, a Nobel peace laureate, was turned back at Manila airport; Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the French President, was "blacklisted". Juan Ramos-Horta, a Timorese resistance leader based in Australia, was unable to attend and deliver the keynote address.

The action of the Philippines President in kowtowing to Indonesia deserves international notice. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Jaime Sin, set the right note when he apologised, "as a Filipino citizen", for the failure of his government "to spearhead the growth of freedom and human dignity" in the region, castigating it, too, for "giving in to the pressure of a foreign nation".

Filipinos fought to overthrow the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in order to replace it with a government guided by democratic principles. The only positive aspect of this episode is that it should earn vigorous opprobrium for Indonesia. International attention will return once more to the plight of those who live and die — in that country's wretched "twenty-seventh province", occupied East Timor.

INDONESIA

Beating a Retreat

Ramos caves in to Jakarta's pressure on Timor forum

By John McBeth in Jakarta, Rigoberto Tiglao in Manila and Colin James in Wellington

JOSE REINARES

Ramos' compromise comes under attack.

It was just another conference of idealists and embittered exiles, and it would have attracted no more than a perfunctory nod from the regional press before sinking back into obscurity. But Jakarta's all-out opposition to the "Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor" in Manila elevated the privately organised forum to the level of an international incident, threatening the Philippines' economic and political ties with Indonesia. In the end, it was Philippine President Fidel Ramos who backed down, banning foreign participation in the conference. In doing so, he dented his own image. The Philippine leader is now under attack at home and abroad for compromising the country's democratic ideals.

Political observers are surprised the Philippines was caught flat-footed, given reports that officials were aware of the impending East Timor conference as early as January 1993. Indeed, in a meeting with chief organiser Renato Constantino Jr. last November, presidential security adviser Jose Almonte said the government could not intervene because that would violate the principles Filipinos fought for in the 1986 overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos. Ramos, however, clearly became alarmed at the strength of the Indonesian reaction. Using special powers reserved only for issues affecting national security and the vital interests of the state, he barred Sydney-based resistance leader Juan Ramos-Horta and seven fellow Timorese participants from the country. Ramos also instructed the Bureau of Immigration to deny entry to other foreign participants.

Conference chairman Constantino, a human-rights activist and the son of a well-known leftwing historian, was bitterly critical of Ramos' action. "This is a clear surrender to Indonesian pressure," he said. "The Ramos administration is acting as if the Philippines is Indonesia's 28th province." Jakarta, for its part, pronounced itself satisfied, even if the seminar still goes ahead.

The Philippines is not the only country to recently raise Indonesian hackles over East Timor. While former Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus was trying to explain Manila's position in Jakarta, New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger was spending part of his May 15-17 official visit repairing fences of his own, after New Zealand parliamentarians drafted a petition demanding the right of self-determination for East Timor.

The diplomatic squalls followed two tours of East Timor by foreign journalists, one of which sparked an impromptu street demonstration and open acts of defiance from political prisoners in the Dili jail. The fires were further stoked in New Zealand by the screening of a British TV documentary that rehashed the recent unhappy history of the former Portuguese colony, annexed by Indonesia in 1975.

For the Philippines, an early casualty of a serious rift with Indonesia would have been Ramos' much-cherished East Asian Growth Area (EAGA), encompassing Davao and General Santos City in southern Mindanao and Indonesia's North Sulawesi province. As it was, the Philippines postponed a May 26-27 bilateral meeting in Davao after Indonesian officials and businessmen sent word they would not be attending.

Antonio Peralta, economic adviser to the EAGA, said nine of the 12 joint ventures due to be signed at the conference were put on hold. "These were not just at the planning stage," he said. "The money had already been remitted to the banks." Meanwhile, the permissive attitude of Indonesian authorities towards Filipino fishermen in their waters changed drastically; about 25 small boats based in General Santos were impounded by the Indonesians in the space of a week.

The EAGA concept relies heavily on a jump-start from the fishing industry and on an understanding that Filipino enterprises will get much of their catch from Indonesian waters. "If the Filipino fishing fleets are prohibited by Indonesian authorities, then General Santos' five canneries would have to close down," said Peralta. Pointing to a planned protest rally in Mindanao over the Timor conference, he told

ASIAN LOBBIES

Tarnished Image

Indonesia seeks to control damage over Timor

Being among "the most underestimated countries" in the world, as United States President Bill Clinton himself put it, Indonesia has long been the favourite whipping-boy of the U.S. Congress. Pressure on Jakarta has mounted recently, and the Indonesian Embassy in Washington is countering by revamping its lobbying effort in Washington.

The 1991 massacre of East Timorese by the Indonesian army in Dili did much to blacken Jakarta's image on Capitol Hill. Jakarta has also had to deal with a new Democratic president who is placing heavy emphasis on human rights in his foreign policy.

As punishment for the Dili incident, Congress in 1992 overrode objections from the Bush administration and voted to cease military aid to Indonesia, also threatening to impose further sanctions. The Clinton administration, too, has taken a hard line against Indonesia's behaviour in East Timor, raising the issue at the United Nations and blocking transfer of second-hand U.S.-made jet fighters from a third country to Indonesia. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, meanwhile, has pressed Jakarta to improve workers' rights, threatening to revoke trade privileges under the generalised scheme of preferences (GSP).

In response to these pressures, the Indonesians have dropped their public relations firm of 16 years, Hill & Knowlton, and hired a high-powered former assistant U.S. trade representative and GSP specialist to deal with the workers' rights issue. Indonesian officials hope that these measures, along with help from friends of the country in Washington stepping forward to argue Jakarta's case, will begin the process of improving its image in the U.S. But the results of Jakarta's efforts may well illustrate the limits of what lobbying can achieve, Congressional critics of Jakarta say. Public relations may help up to a point, they argue, but Indonesia has little chance of making any real headway until it displays a willingness to make real improvements in the human-rights situation in Timor.

Indonesia's sensitivity over Timor and its sometimes ham-fisted and counter-productive attempts to control the issue internationally were highlighted recently by Jakarta's reaction to a conference on Timor scheduled to be held in Manila from May 31-June 4. Its ultimately successful attempt to pressure Manila into banning attendance at the conference by Timorese independence leaders and international human-rights activists has raised a storm of protest (*see story page 17*).

Jakarta first acknowledged the importance of lobbying in Washington as far back as 1977, when it hired Hill & Knowlton in an attempt to rebuild international confidence in its financial system following the huge scandal that enveloped the state oil firm, Pertamina. Many have since questioned whether Jakarta got its money's worth: it paid the public relations firm about US$3 million in 1993. One old Indonesia hand, an American who himself advises Jakarta, thinks not. "There was a drop in the firm's attentiveness and inputs to Indonesia; it wasn't anticipating issues and coming up with new ideas to cope with them," the adviser says.

After the Dili incident, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas came to Washington for what was widely seen as an unsuccessful attempt at damage control. Facing criticism that Indonesian soldiers responsible for the Dili killings were getting off too lightly, Alatas recalled the My Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians by U.S. soldiers, a comparison which didn't go down well with his American audience. Alatas was trying to defend the indefensible, one human rights activist says, adding: "Alatas was also getting bad advice."

So far Jakarta has not replaced Hill & Knowlton. Some political work seems to have been channelled to public relations firms Burson-Marsteller and Smith-McCabe, both of which established ties with Jakarta in 1992. Knowledgeable sources say Jakarta is still looking for a more pro-active professional lobbyist, with experience in political issues.

The GSP specialist chosen by Indonesia's ambassador to the U.S., Arifin Siregar, is Doral Cooper of Crowell & Moring International, a firm which lobbies on trade issues. Cooper started at the USTR's office in 1977 and rose to the rank of assistant before leaving in 1985. Her job included developing and implementing U.S. trade policy in Asia and administering the GSP programme.

Siregar is obviously counting on Cooper to prepare a convincing case to present to USTR Kantor. When the Bush administration raised the Indonesian workers' rights issue, Jakarta was advised by law firm White & Case, which, like Hill & Knowlton, was hired in 1977. Although Indonesia was spared sanctions at that time, some Indonesia hands say White & Case, not being experts, were not helpful on the workers' rights issue.

■ Susumu Awanohara

the REVIEW: "I've never seen a community so mad."

For Ramos, the storm was troubling in other ways. Not only is there an unwritten rule among the six Asean states that they must avoid becoming embroiled in each other's internal problems, Jakarta has been playing a particularly constructive role in ongoing peace talks between Manila and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) — a role that was obviously jeopardised as well.

ROMEO GACAD/AFP

Philippine demonstrators had no kind words for Indonesia.

East Timor has never been a major issue in New Zealand, but the TV documentary and Bolger's impending visit prompted 51 of the 99 members of parliament to present a petition to the Indonesian ambassador on May 5 calling for self-determination for East Timor, the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, a halt in transmigration and an end to human-rights abuses.

By the time Bolger arrived in Indonesia, New Zealand Governor-General Dame Catherine Tizard had compounded his difficulties. When the new Indonesian ambassador, Dahlia Soemolang, presented her credentials on May 10, New Zealand's supposedly apolitical head-of-state told her, "East Timor continues to be of concern to New Zealanders." The remark was intended to be private, but it was picked up by New Zealand's *Herald* newspaper.

The prime minister refused to personally pass on the petition to Indonesian authorities, and reiterated Wellington's long-stated position that East Timor was now part of Indonesia. He nonetheless raised concerns about human rights during subsequent talks with President Suharto.

Suharto responded by giving Indonesia's version of the events preceding the East Timor invasion, and then issued an invitation for New Zealand parliamentarians to see Indonesia's 27th province for themselves. Later, Bolger said he hoped an ongoing dialogue between Indonesia and Portugal would lead to a "just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement" of the Timor question.

Back home, opposition Labour Party MP Phil Goff, who organised the petition, scoffed at Suharto's invitation: "Nobody is going to speak out when, half-an-hour after the New Zealand MPs have left the country, they [the Timorese] will be subject to arbitrary detention, possibly torture and possibly execution."

New Zealand's concern over human rights in Indonesia manifested itself in 1990, when it refused to support Jakarta's bid for a seat on the United Nations Human Rights Commission. But now officials feel Jakarta is making genuine efforts to clean up its act. In fact, Wellington is supporting Indonesia's campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council, reciprocating the backing it received when it made a similar — and successful — bid of its own two years ago.

While New Zealand's attention span was bound to be limited, the spat with the Philippines over the East Timor conference threatened to be much more disruptive. After meeting with special envoy Manglapus, Alatas declared: "Let's not use diplomatic language here. Indonesia is disappointed at the Philippine Government's inability to stop the seminar."

Alatas claimed Manila pledged to ban the seminar when it was first announced last year. But in March, Philippine officials sent word that the administration would not be able to make good on its promise. Indonesia was accepting no excuses. "Although we can fully understand their constitutional constraints," the foreign minister said, "there is also something else, called national interest."

The 13 groups closely involved in the organisation of the May 31-June 4 conference include the National Council for Maubere Assistance, the umbrella group that includes East Timor's Fretilin resistance organisation. Also involved are the Netherlands-based International Platform of Jurists for East Timor and British Lord Eric Avebury's Parliamentarians for East Timor.

Few participants of international standing were expected to attend, but that mattered little to Indonesia, which is extremely sensitive to any criticism of its sovereignty over East Timor. Of the four Indonesian invitees, only human-rights activist H. J. C. Princen and Satya Wacana University lecturer George Aditjondro initially confirmed they would attend.

Aditjondro is probably the only Indonesian intellectual to hit out openly at Indonesia's policy on East Timor. In March, Australian newspapers published excerpts from some of his papers on the issue, including one that gave a much higher death toll for the 1991 Dili massacre than previous accounts. The Indonesian academic later repeated the claim, originally made in a Timorese survey published in Lisbon, during an interview with Australian TV in Singapore.

Although he has been accused of being unpatriotic, Aditjondro says he has not been the target of any direct government harassment. "I think that is an indication of how fluid the situation [on East Timor] really is," he told the REVIEW. He was, however, removed from a list of prospective speakers at a planned environmental conference in Dili aimed at building ties with Timorese groups. The early May event was later scrapped.

While the Indonesian Government speaks with one voice, the Foreign Ministry and the armed forces differ over how best to deal with Timor. Tired of slapping plaster over a running sore, civilian officials would prefer a more creative approach involving a degree of demilitarisation. The military feels the province is its patch, in large part because of past sacrifices, while paradoxically conceding — as one general did in April — that it could be two more generations before most Timorese accept Indonesian rule. ■

East Timor

Publicity, at last

MANILA

FILIPINOS rarely pay much attention to East Timor, so when an obscure group of liberals decided last year to hold a conference in Manila about nasty goings-on in what Indonesia considers its 27th province, nobody showed any interest. But thanks to official clumsiness, when the conference opened on May 31st, East Timor had become the centre of a diplomatic row between Indonesia and the Philippines.

Before the rift, relations were friendly: Indonesia had supplied the Philippines with oil and rice during shortages, and recently mediated between the Philippine government and its Muslim rebels. The Filipinos have been cultivating Indonesia with an eye to economic co-operation. Then came the row over East Timor, an ex-Portuguese colony where 200,000 people may have died since Indonesia invaded in 1975.

Indonesian guests cancelled their plans to attend a fancy business gathering to be held on the Philippines' southern island of Mindanao. The row escalated when the Indonesian industry minister, Tungky Ariwibowo, failed to turn up for an official meeting with Fidel Ramos, the Philippines' president. By then, said an official in the president's office, "We got the message that they mean business."

Mr Ramos was stuck between trying to appease a partner in the Association of South-East Asian Nations and deflecting criticism that the president of one of Asia's most democratic countries was being arm-twisted by a military dictatorship. Appeasement won. After a ruling from the Supreme Court, Mr Ramos let the conference go ahead, but barred foreign participants from coming. Among those excluded were Jose Ramos Horta, an East Timorese resistance leader, Mairead Maguire, a Northern Irish Nobel peace prize winner, and Danielle Mitterrand, wife of the French president.

The Indonesians were somewhat mollified, but the only really happy people were the conference organisers. The opening ceremony was crowded with journalists—an unthinkable eventuality had it not been for the Indonesians' help.

The Sydney Morning Herald

Friday, June 10, 1994

Jakarta's bungled Timor diplomacy

The Philippines Government has gone into damage-control mode after a disturbing episode in which Manila bowed to intense Indonesian diplomatic pressure to gag a conference on East Timor. President Fidel Ramos says his Government wants to repair ties with other countries strained by a ban on foreigners attending a Manila conference on East Timor. The trouble began when organisers of the Manila meeting invited 150 delegates from 15 nations to discuss allegations that 200,000 Timorese have died since Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975. This was too much for Jakarta, which felt that the Philippines, an ASEAN partner, should not be giving aid and comfort to those who question East Timor's status as a province of Indonesia.

Abandoning its preference for low-key diplomacy, Indonesia began twisting arms. It twisted hard. In mid-May, Jakarta pulled out of a business development conference in the southern Philippines and threatened to abandon its role as an intermediary in peace talks between Manila and Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines. Behind the scenes, Indonesia was wheeling up even heavier guns. According to General Ramos, General Soeharto's Government threatened to block up to US$700 million in potential Indonesian investment in the Philippines, which has long been the sick man of ASEAN.

In the end, Jakarta had its way. Ramos, feeling he could not afford to alienate ASEAN's largest member, stopped short of banning the conference but did ban foreigners, including expatriate East Timorese, from attending the meeting. Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of French President François Mitterrand, was among 36 people placed on a watch-list of prohibited foreign delegates. Irish human-rights activist Tom Hyland and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mairead Maguire were expelled when they arrived in Manila. As it happened, the none-too-subtle Indonesian pressure proved counter-productive. The ban on prominent European delegates ensured that the conference attracted far greater world attention than would otherwise have been the case.

It is more than 18 years since Indonesian troops invaded East Timor and the routine assurances that things are on the mend are no more persuasive today than they have been in the past. East Timor remains a festering sore. Jakarta's policy is to deal harshly with those Timorese who oppose Indonesian rule while toughing things out internationally. The policy is not working. To Indonesia's evident alarm, criticism is now coming not only from North America, Western Europe and Australia, but also from a number of Asian countries. A number of Japanese politicians have already expressed concern about repression in East Timor. Now, there is criticism from within ASEAN itself. Two weeks ago Indonesia protested to a Thai newspaper, *The Nation*, after it carried two editorials critical of Indonesian policy on East Timor.

This episode provides a reminder that in some ways Indonesia has not changed as much as we may like to think. The so-called "New Order" Government of President Soeharto has shown itself willing on occasion to fall back on the clumsy standover tactics that were so often employed by the "Old Order" government of President Sukarno.

Jakarta is unlikely to employ that kind of tactic on Australia, which, being non-Asian, is allowed more leeway than a country like the Philippines. All the same, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans must be hoping the East Timor lobby will not decide to hold a Manila-style conference in Darwin.

The New York Times

Founded in 1851

ADOLPH S OCHS, Publisher 1896-1935
ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER, Publisher 1935-1961
ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher 1961-1963
ARTHUR OCHS SULZBERGER, Publisher 1963-1992

The Manila Folder

Credit President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines with blunt honesty in explaining why he bowed to Indonesian pressure and censored a conference in Manila on East Timor. "What was at stake here?" Mr. Ramos remarked to reporters. "Some 15 billion pesos [$700 million] worth of investments, projects, enterprises and agreed partnerships or consortiums."

For that consideration, the Philippine Government prohibited foreigners from taking part in the Manila meeting, barring Danielle Mitterrand, wife of the French President, and deporting the Irish Nobel Peace laureate Mairead Maguire.

This mess of pottage has apparently satisfied the Suharto regime in Jakarta, which wishes everybody would forget its lawless grab in 1975 of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. As many as 200,000 people there have perished since Indonesia's seizure and annexation. One can fault Mr. Ramos for yielding to Indonesia's economic threats, but the greater blame and the larger guilt lie with Manila's powerful and bullying neighbor.

Still, there is a consolation. Indonesia's use of a 15-billion-peso club to stifle free speech in a neighboring democracy has stirred an uproar elsewhere in Asia. Instead of rendering East Timor less visible, Indonesian diplomacy has achieved the reverse, riveting attention on Jakarta's past reluctance to permit unimpeded access by humanitarian and human rights groups to a people it characterizes as content and submissive. The reality was expressed in a message to Manila from the absent Mrs. Mitterrand, censuring Indonesia's military regime for relying on "terror, prohibition, gagging," and avoiding good-faith negotiations.

More may be known about East Timor in July, when it will be visited by a U.N. special reporter on human rights. In trying to manage the news in Manila, Indonesia has only quickened the world's curiosity about what it seems to be hiding.

MONDAY, JUNE 13, 1994

Herald INTERNATIONAL Tribune

PUBLISHED WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST

Spotlight on Indonesia

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— THE NEW YORK TIMES.

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Sovereignty and Trade

While the collisions between trade laws and environmental laws are sometimes real, they are manageable — both legally and politically. The new World Trade Organization is not going to subvert American sovereignty or nullify American environmental policy. The House Ways and Means Committee wisely invited Representative Newt Gingrich, the Republican whip, into its hearing on Friday at which the administration trade representative, Mickey Kantor, was testifying. Mr. Gingrich raised the sovereignty issue some time ago, and the colloquy between them served very usefully to refine the debate.

The WTO will come into existence next year, but U.S. participation depends on enactment of the trade bill. Mr. Gingrich wanted assurance that the WTO would not be able to expand its jurisdiction in the future without congressional assent. Mr. Kantor said that he would support language to prevent that. Mr. Gingrich is uneasy about Vice President Al Gore's suggestion that the WTO, once established, will begin to take an interest in not only environmental but also labor standards, neither of which is included in its present statute.

While sovereignty will remain undamaged, it is quite true that, as Mr. Gingrich said, the new trade agreement will tighten some of the constraints on the United States. That is in the nature of any agreement: one country commits itself not to do certain things in return for assurance that other countries will follow the same rule. First there was the dolphin case, and now there is the car case.

To the outrage of many environmental organizations, two trade tribunals have now found that the United States violates present trade agreements by banning foreign tuna caught with drift nets. The purpose of the ban is to protect dolphins, but the agreements disapprove of using production methods as criteria for imports. The purpose is to prevent protectionists in, say, Europe from banning American beef or soybeans because of the way they are produced. The right solution to the dolphin case, already in progress, is an international treaty outlawing drift nets.

The car case is different. It involves the fuel efficiency rules, which were written deliberately to help American manufacturers of big cars and to hurt their foreign competitors. The United States will probably lose this one. It can then either pay compensation to Europe or, better, change the law to make it neutral in its impact on foreign and domestic cars. Why should the government have to do that? To prevent other countries from doing the same thing, on a bigger scale, to American exports in their markets.

The United States exports nearly half a trillion dollars' worth of goods a year, more than any other country, and it is counting on increased exports to lift American employment and incomes through this decade. That is why it needs the WTO and the broad new trade agreement that it would administer. Mr. Kantor never tires (fortunately) of reminding Congress that the United States brings more trade complaints than any other country, and wins four out of five.

— THE WASHINGTON POST.

FERNANDO SEPE JR.—AP

STUDENTS SHOW SOLIDARITY for East Timor victims outside the Indonesian embassy in Manila

■ CONFERENCES

A Power Play Backfires

Indonesia gets its dander up over an East Timor human rights meeting in the Philippines

By **SANDRA BURTON** MANILA

THERE WERE MOMENTS IN THE PHILIPpines last week that harked back to the bad old days when strongman Ferdinand Marcos called all the shots. Little more than an hour before the Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor was due to open in Manila, organizers huddled with their lawyers, waiting to see if they would be allowed to proceed. Fifty foreign participants who had managed to slip into the country were in hiding at the University of the Philippines, waiting for a signal to emerge. Then came the good news: the Philippine Supreme Court had overturned a lower court order banning their conclave.

There was, however, a catch. The high court also upheld the government's authority to deport any foreigners who tried to attend the meeting. Defiant organizers linked arms with students, nuns and priests to form a protective cordon around the conference guests and marched to the university's College of Law, where they declared the meeting open. During the week, 10 of the 38 foreigners on the Philippine government's blacklist were expelled on arrival in Manila, but deportation proceedings against those already on campus were eventually dropped.

The conference itself was anticlimactic—no doubt it would have merited only brief mentions in the regional press—but for the free-speech furor in the Philippines, a full-fledged democracy since Marcos' 1986 overthrow. Responsibility for the flap seemed to rest with the regime of Indonesian President Suharto. As the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia has often condemned the interference of powerful nations in the domestic affairs of weaker ones. But so determined was Suharto to squelch international denunciations of Indonesia's forcible 1976 annexation of the former Portuguese colony that he had bullied the government of Philippine President Fidel Ramos to block the multinational meeting, sponsored by dozens of private organizations worldwide.

PAT ROQUE—AP

BANNED FROM THE MANILA gathering, foreign delegates protest at the law school

Initially Ramos rejected the pressure. Then Suharto turned up the heat. Last month Indonesian patrol boats seized 25 Philippine fishermen in the unmarked sea between the Philippines and Indonesia for allegedly straying into Indonesian waters. Then Jakarta said it would stop brokering peace talks between the Ramos government and secessionist Filipino Muslim rebels. Finally Jakarta threatened to cancel $700 million worth of planned Indonesian investments in the Philippines, including such projects as a toll road in metro Manila, if the meeting went ahead. Ramos wilted. Invoking "national interest," he announced that he would continue to defend the rights of free speech and assembly of Filipinos attending the five-day meeting. But he effectively denied the same rights to foreign visitors.

The immediate reaction was harsh—and highly embarrassing for Manila. French First Lady Danielle Mitterrand, who had planned to attend the conference, accused Indonesia of "tyranny" and "blackmail." Filipinos were also distressed. "It would seem that we merely exchanged Uncle Sam as our master for Suharto," complained law professor Joaquin Bernas, a longtime opponent of the U.S. military presence in the archipelago. Editorial writers characterized Ramos as a "wimp" and the compliant Philippines as "the region's doormat." Manila's Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin expressed "distress" over the administration's mishandling of the affair.

Further attempts by Ramos to appease Jakarta were undermined by the independent judiciary. At first Marciano Bacalla, a military judge appointed by Ramos to the civilian bench, agreed to hold up the meeting. But then the Supreme Court, whose members were largely appointed before Ramos took office, overturned the ban.

The big loser in what the Jakarta press labeled the "Manila incident" was Indonesia itself. The clumsy attempt at big-power browbeating only focused attention on the conference and on East Timor, which Jakarta claims as the country's 27th province. Even the normally cautious local press disagreed with the government's tactics. Asked the English-language Jakarta *Post:* "Is this the kind of publicity we want?" —*With reporting by Nelly Sindayen/Manila*

CONTROVERSIES

Neighborhood Squabble

A Human Rights Conference on East Timor Backfires

Nobody seemed to have come out looking good from the brouhaha over a human rights conference on East Timor held in Manila from May 24 to May 28. Philippines President Fidel Ramos lost face by attempting to appease Jakarta by blocking the conference. It went ahead anyway, predictably condemning Jakarta's annexation of the territory in 1976, and calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the former Portuguese colony.

But the pressure that Jakarta exerted on Manila may have backfired too. It ruined months of patient work by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, including arranging two visits to the province by foreign journalists to demonstrate that the usually negative reports coming out of Timor do not tell the full story.

Perhaps few would have anticipated such an all-round public relations fiasco when the Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor was planned. Visiting Jakarta last November, Philippine National Security adviser Jose Almonte assured Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas: "Don't worry about [conference convenor] Renato Constantino Jr. He's a very reasonable person." But Almonte may have over estimated Constantino's "reasonableness." When the retired general asked him to cancel the meeting in the interests of good neighborly relations, Constantino refused.

In November Alatas asked Manila's Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel the conference, and four months later Almonte prepared a list of Philippine responses should Indonesia persist in its opposition. He was particularly concerned about the anticipated appearance of such high-profile people as Danielle Mitterrand, wife of French President Francois Mitterrand, Maria Barroso Soares, first lady of Portugal, and Nobel Prize winners Mairead Maguire of Ireland and Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa.

The Philippine-Indonesian Society got a suburban Quezon City court to issue a temporary restraining order stopping the conference, but the Supreme Court unanimously overruled the judge. "On the line were free speech, freedom of assembly and academic freedom," said University of the Philippines professor Alex Magno.

Under the Philippine Constitution, Ramos can't prohibit a peaceful assembly, but he does have power over who enters the country. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation barred about 40 prominent foreigners, including Mitterrand and Soares. The fact that the two first ladies in the end had decided not to come hardly lessened the damage. Portugal protested the blacklisting of the wife of its president. Danielle Mitterrand accused Indonesia of blackmail. Philippine First Lady Amelita Ramos may receive a less than fulsome welcome when she visits Paris later this month.

President Ramos had sent a personal envoy, former foreign secretary Raul Manglapus, to explain Manila's stand on the conference to President Suharto. Suharto refused to receive him. When it was clear the conference would take place, Jakarta demonstrated its irritation by ordering the arrest of about 200 Filipino deep-sea fishermen found in Indonesian waters. The crackdown paralyzed the operation of canneries on Mindanao. A meeting to promote the East ASEAN Growth Area, scheduled in late May in Davao City, was postponed until the dust raised by the flap had time to settle.

The controversy spread throughout the region. "ASEAN's new bully boy," blared the headline in an editorial in Bangkok's English-language newspaper, *The Nation*. It drew a strong protest from the Indonesian embassy. In Malaysia, human rights activists protesting in front of the Indonesian embassy were roughed up by a group who emerged from the embassy. Embassy officials later called the police.

Indonesia's human rights activists were happy by the fuss. The government's pressure on the Philippines had put their names in the headlines every day. Human rights campaigner H.J.C. Princen, denied a visa, sent a message to Manila on videotape. Another critic, George Aditjondro, sent his speech by fax. Said one diplomat: "The result is that international attention is back on East Timor. If Indonesia had just let the conference go ahead, it's unlikely anyone would have taken much notice."

Others stood up in defense of a special relationship between ASEAN partners. "In terms of ASEAN solidarity, I think the Philippine conference organizers should have been a bit more sensitive," said Razak Baginda, director of the Malaysian Strategic Defense Institute. "To invite high-profile people into the country to discuss your neighbor's problems, I think, is insensitive."

Said Juan Ponce Enrile, former Philippines defense secretary: "Between Portugal and Indonesia I would choose Indonesia. When we were in need of food, Indonesia gave us rice. During the oil crisis, Indonesia supplied oil. When we were faced with a secessionist movement in Mindanao, Indonesia was behind us. What did Portugal ever do except try to colonize us?" Unfortunately for Ramos, his government's handling of the controversy surrounding the meeting tended to anger everyone and please no one. ■

Edwin Tuyay



Chan Looi Tat

In Manila, the conference defied Ramos; in Kuala Lumpur, a protest: Everyone got angry

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW

JUNE 16, 1994

REGIONAL

PHILIPPINES

Protesting Too Much

Ramos' democratic credentials dented

By Sheila Coronel in Manila

Thank goodness it's over. That's what President Fidel Ramos must have felt when a five-day conference on East Timor ended on June 4 in Manila. But the Philippine leader did not emerge unscathed from the international flap surrounding the conference, which planted the seeds for further problems with Indonesia down the road.

Only about two dozen Asian and European delegates managed to slip through the Philippine Government's ban on foreigners attending the privately organised meeting, a ban ordered by Ramos following severe pressure from Indonesia. The conference ended with an agreement to establish a coalition for East Timor based in the Philippines, a move that is likely to become a long-term —though probably minor — irritant between Manila and Jakarta. The participants also proposed a peace plan for East Timor anchored on the gradual withdrawal of Indonesian troops and the holding of a referendum on Timorese independence.

Indonesia, whose high-handed opposition vaulted the obscure conference into the international spotlight, is viewed by most here as the biggest loser in the fracas. But Ramos also took a beating for bowing to Indonesian pressure. His tarnished democratic credentials were salvaged by a Supreme Court decision — released just two hours before the conference was scheduled to begin — that banning the meeting altogether would constitute an infringement on free expression. That gave Ramos an excuse to allow the conference, thereby mollifying his critics somewhat.

At the same time, the court upheld the government's right to bar foreigners from entering the country on grounds of "national security and national interest." The decision legitimised the measures Ramos had taken earlier to appease Indonesia. These included turning back 10 foreign delegates who had flown in for the meeting, among them Irish Nobel laureate Mairead Maguire. The government banned 34 others, including human rights activist Danielle Mitterrand, wife of the French president.

The day after the conference opened, Ramos heaved a sigh of relief. "If you look at the events taking place," he told reporters, "we have found the Solomonic solution, thanks to the support of everybody, particularly the Supreme Court."

But in Manila, the president's critics refused to be pacified. "The Ramos administration has ignored . . . the Filipino political culture that has been nurtured on the principles of liberal democracy," said the Philippine *Daily Inquirer*. "By trying to please Indonesia," insists conference organiser Renato Constantino, "Ramos alienated the whole world and tarnished not only the image of the Philippines but also his image as a leader."



ROMEO GACAD/AFP

An airing in Manila for the East Timor issue.

The biggest winner to emerge from the controversy was the East Timor independence movement. "The many years of international indifference have been shattered," said Pedro Pinto Leyte of the Holland-based International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, one of the conference convenors. "This would not have been possible without the help of the Indonesians. Without their help, this conference would not have been such a huge success."

Organisers said the impact of the Manila conference far exceeded that of previous meetings on East Timor, including a "people's tribunal" held in Bangkok in 1992 and a conference in Macau last year. Indonesia, which invaded and annexed the former Portuguese colony in 1975, was pilloried in the international press for trying to scuttle the conference.

According to Philippine officials, it was Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas who informed the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta of the conference in October 1993. The information reached Ramos, who ordered his security adviser, Jose Almonte, to handle the matter discreetly. "They asked us to scrap the meeting," recalls Almonte, "but we told them we can't do that because it would go against our core democratic value, which is freedom of expression. However, we told them we would mobilise the democratic forces to ensure that the Philippines will not be used to embarrass Indonesia."

Almonte then held a series of meetings with conference organiser Constantino, to ask for assurances that the meeting would not be inflammatory. "Our meetings were cordial," says Constantino. "There were no indications that they would stop the conference or ban people from attending it."

But things changed, Philippine officials say, when President Suharto decided to take a hard-line stance. "Suharto took the matter very personally," says an official who was privy to the negotiations. "He reacted at the emotional level. He could not understand why the Philippines could do this to him after all he had done for us."

Within a few days in late May, Jakarta postponed a second round of peace talks it was hosting between Muslim rebels of Mindanao and the Philippine Government. It also told Indonesian delegates to pull out of a business convention in the southern Philippine city of Davao, cancelled 12 joint-venture agreements worth US$300 million, and apprehended 25 Philippine fishing boats accused of poaching in Indonesian waters.

In response to the pressure, Ramos tried to ban the conference and barred the entry of foreign delegates. "We understand Indonesia because we went through a dictatorship and we understand the intensity of Indonesia's feelings," said Almonte, explaining Manila's actions. Jakarta, however, was not as appreciative of the wonky ways of Philippine democracy. "They could not understand us because for 27 years, when Suharto said stop, they stopped," said Almonte.

But, the presidential adviser asserted, the whole experience has made Philippine-Indonesian ties stronger because Jakarta "now has a very good idea of how Philippine democracy works." In the end, he said, "the gainer here is our democratic process. We have shown that in Asia, we're a country that may not have one voice on many issues, but we have one voice on the basic value of freedom."

Almonte's positive view of the affair did not convince the president's critics. "Despite his democratic posturing," wrote columnist Amando Doronila, Ramos "has not made up his mind whether he is a democrat or an authoritarian." ■